Typical violations, as Vitaly Lyutikov emphasized, are untimely

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hese statistics were cited during a speech at the section "Sustainability in the BANI world: barriers, strategies and opportunities" during the SOC Forum-2023 by Deputy Director of the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control Vitaly Lyutikov. According to his assessment, despite the radical change in the threat situation, the same old problems have to be solved at both the regulatory and technical levels.

According to Vitaly Lyutikov, FSTEC lithuania whatsapp number database has issued more than 1,600 orders to comply with legislation on the protection of critical information infrastructure facilities. Also, the regulator sends a third of applications for assigning categories to critical information infrastructure facilities for recategorization, as a rule, due to the operator underestimating the declared significance of the facility and possible damage. In total, since the beginning of the year, FSTEC, as Vitaly Lyutikov stated, has identified about 700 violations, while its employees have drawn up 83 administrative protocols against violators.
database updates and incorrect antivirus software settings. In addition, according to the deputy head of FSTEC, the placement of automated workstations from which critical information infrastructure facilities are administered outside the protected area is widespread.

As Vitaly Lyutikov noted, half of the systems have unpatched vulnerabilities. This, according to the deputy head of FSTEC, is a direct consequence of foreign software vendors leaving Russia and disconnecting Russian users from technical support. Compared to the previous year, the number of such systems, according to Vitaly Lyutikov, has increased by 2.5 times.

Russian software developers, according to Vitaly Lyutikov, have still not overcome their immaturity in terms of secure development. A direct consequence of this immaturity, according to the regulator's representative, is that there is a significant increase in attacks on the supply chain, and a successful hack of one vendor or integrator entails penetration into the infrastructure of at least 10 of its customers. The situation, as Vitaly Lyutikov specifically noted, is complicated by the lack of regulatory requirements for contractors, even if we are talking about companies that support government information systems (GIS).

Deputy Head of the National Coordination Center for Computer Incidents (NCCI) Petr Belov noted that in 2023 the structure of attacks on Russian companies and institutions has changed significantly: if in 2022 attacks by numerous but poorly organized masses of hacktivists dominated, then in 2023 they were replaced by professional representatives of foreign intelligence agencies. The goal of the attacks in 2023, as stated by the NCCI representative, is to gain access to data (38% of attacks) and disrupt the functioning of the IT infrastructure of the attacked organizations (25%), including data destruction. The main attack methods, according to the NCCI, are exploitation of vulnerabilities and phishing.

Also, as Petr Belov noted, if in 2022 60% of data leaks were fake, then in 2023 they accounted for no more than 15% of the total number of incidents. However, according to him, companies and organizations that allowed the leak are still trying to pass them off as fakes to cover up the incidents. Such a practice, as Petr Belov emphasized, complicates the investigation, especially when it comes to attacks on supply chains.